Offentlig ansatte er overrepresentert i politikken
Offentlig ansatte er sterkt overrepresentert i lokalpolitikken. De stiller oftere til valg enn…
Professor - Campus Bergen
Department of Economics
Geys, Benny & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2023)
Kyklos (Basel) Doi: 10.1111/kykl.12358
Geys, Benny & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2023)
Politicians are commonly believed to gain financially from holding and/or having held office. We argue that there may often also be economic downsides to pursuing a political career, and investigate whether and when politicians can(not) capitalize on their political experience. We thereby study both entry into and exit from political office, and directly compare the returns to politics across government levels and types of politicians. Empirically, we build on detailed information from Norwegian administrative register data over the period 1970-2019 to study individual-level income developments before, during and after a political career at the national and local levels (covering nearly 22,000 individuals and 700,000 person-years). Using an event-study methodology, we show that politicians on average witness a significant income boost during their time in office. In sharp contrast, leaving political office is on average associated with a substantial drop in income, which generally outweighs the income gain from entry into office. These findings suggest that most politicians face a net present value loss from holding office.
Geys, Benny; Lægreid, Per, Murdoch, Zuzana & Trondal, Jarle (2023)
Building on a growing literature assessing the societal impact of terrorism, this article analyzes whether and how a terror attack targeting public institutions affects civil servants in their day-to-day work. This is an important question to enhance our understanding of how terrorism can (or cannot) affect the operation of core government functions. Theoretically, the study contributes to a broader account of the political consequences of terrorism by combining insights from social identity and organization theory. Empirically, we exploit a two-wave survey fielded before and after the 2011 terror attack in Norway, which allows us to study the same civil servants (N = 186) before and after this event. While terrorists wish to disrupt public institutions, our findings indicate that a terror attack targeting core government institutions strengthens internal cohesion and increases attention to political signals in work tasks. We discuss implications of these effects for the functioning of democratic government.
Geys, Benny (2023)
Geys, Benny; Connolly, Sara, Kassim, Hussein & Murdoch, Zuzana (2023)
Public Management Review Doi: 10.1080/14719037.2023.2222139
Carvalho, Bruno; Custódio, Claudia, Geys, Benny, Mendes, Diogo & Peralta, Susana (2023)
Electoral Studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy, 84 Doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102625
Geys, Benny; Murdoch, Zuzana & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2023)
Journal of Politics
Schönhage, Nanna Lauritz; Bækgaard, Martin & Geys, Benny (2023)
Schönhage, Nanna Lauritz & Geys, Benny (2023)
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 48(2), s. 305- 331. Doi: 10.1111/lsq.12377
Scandals can cause serious damage to political parties’ brand name and reputation, which may taint all members of the party—even those not implicated in the scandal. In this article, we therefore explore how (uninvolved) politicians are likely to react to the eruption of such events. Building on a survey among UK local councilors (N = 2133), we first document the prevalence of distinct response strategies (such as distancing oneself from the scandal-hit party or redirecting attention to similar events in other parties). Then, building on a between-subject survey-experimental design, we assess the moderating roles of partisanship and scandal type. We show that a scandal in one’s own party reduces the probability of distancing oneself from the scandal-hit party (particularly among men). We also find that scandal type matters: pointing out similar scandals in other parties is less likely for sex scandals compared to financial scandals (particularly among women).
Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten (2022)
Mause, Karsten & Polk, Andreas (red.). Handbuch Lobbyismus
Die Nebentätigkeiten von Politikerinnen und Politikern sind in Deutschland, Großbritannien und anderen Ländern seit Jahren Gegenstand kontroverser Diskussionen in Politik und Öffentlichkeit. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über den Stand der Forschung zu diesem möglichen Einflusskanal des Lobbyismus. Zunächst werden auf theoretisch-konzeptioneller Ebene die potenziellen Probleme der Nebentätigkeitspraxis erläutert. Anschließend werden empirische Studien vorgestellt, die die theoretischen Zusammenhänge in der Realität untersucht haben. Zudem diskutiert der Beitrag die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Regulierung von Nebentätigkeiten und Nebeneinkünften.
Geys, Benny; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2022)
Geys, Benny & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2022)
Does working in the public rather than the private sector have a causal effect on electoral participation? Extant evidence using cross-sectional survey data remains unpersuasive due to data limitations and concerns posed by preference-based job selection. We address these challenges using population-wide individual-level register data on voter turnout covering four Norwegian local and national elections between 2013 and 2019. We identify causal effects by tracking the same individuals over time during (a) shifts between private- and public-sector employment, (b) relocations between municipalities, and (c) shifts into retirement. We find that local public-sector employees display 1–3 percentage points higher voter turnout compared with private-sector employees. These effects arise particularly when working in their residential municipality, but they largely dissipate upon retirement.
Schönhage, Nanna Lauritz & Geys, Benny (2022)
Do politicians perceive scandals differently when they implicate members of their own party rather than another party? We address this question using a between-subject survey experiment, whereby we randomly assign UK local councillors (N - 2133) to vignettes describing a major national-level scandal in their own party versus another party. Our results show that local politicians perceive a significantly larger impact of this national scandal on the national party image when it concerns their own party (relative to another party). When evaluating the same scandal’s impact on the local party image, no similar effect is observed. This suggests that local politicians tone down the local impact of a national scandal more when thinking about their own party. We suggest this derives from a form of motivated reasoning whereby politicians selectively focus on information allowing a more negative view of direct electoral opponents. These findings arise independent of the type of scandal under consideration
Murdoch, Zuzana; Connolly, Sara Jane, Kassim, Hussein & Geys, Benny (2022)
The representation of specific groups and social interests within (or by) the civil service has long been a concern of public administration scholarship. Yet, much of this literature focuses on representation at a single point in time. In this article, we propose a more dynamic perspective. In terms of theory, we postulate specific temporal relationships between triggering cues (e.g., a crisis event) and the representation decisions of civil servants. We specify two complementary mechanisms underlying these relationships: that is, a sensemaking process whereby the perceived meaning and relative salience of distinct groups and interests changes over time; and a shift in bureaucrats' discretion to represent specific groups or interests changes over time. We illustrate these time-dependent processes using interview and survey data from the European Commission.
Geys, Benny; Murdoch, Zuzana & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)
Journal of public administration research and theory, 32(2), s. 326- 341. Doi: 10.1093/jopart/muab034
Titl, Vitezslav; De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny (2021)
World Development, 148(105666) Doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105666
Public procurement markets are worth 10–15% of global GDP. Recent empirical evidence suggests that firms’ political donations can induce important distortions in the allocation of public procurement contracts. In this article, we employ a non-parametric efficiency model to study the implications of such distortions for the regional governments’ efficiency. Using a unique dataset covering the Czech regions over the 2007–2017 period, we find that the efficiency of public good provision is lower when a larger share of public procurement contracts is awarded to firms donating to the party in power (‘party donors’) – even when we account for quality differences in public goods provision. We link the dependence on politically connected firms to the institutional design of the procurement allocation process (i.e. the use of less restrictive and less open allocation procedures), which helps explaining the mechanics behind the observed decrease in efficiency.
Achbari, Wahideh; Geys, Benny & Doosje, Bert Jan (2021)
Intergroup relations theory posits that cross-group friendship reduces threat perceptions and negative emotions about outgroups. This has been argued to mitigate the negative effects of ethnic diversity on generalized trust. Yet, direct tests of this friendship-trust relation, especially including perceptions of threat and negative affect as mediators, have remained rare at the individual level. In this article, we bridge this research gap using representative data from eight European countries (Group-Focused Enmity). We employ structural equation modelling (SEM) to model mediated paths of cross-group friendship on generalized trust via perceptions of threat and negative affect. We find that both the total effect as well as the (mediated) total indirect effect of cross-group friendship on generalized trust are weak when compared with similar paths estimated for prejudice.
Fiva, Jon H.; Geys, Benny, Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)
Building on agency-theoretical perspectives of public bureaucracies, we argue that politician–bureaucrat preference alignment can have important implications for bureaucrats’ pay. We study such private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians using detailed data on all 1,632 top administrators active in all Norwegian municipalities over a period of 25 years (1991–2015). Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician–bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of top bureaucrats ran for political office. We focus explicitly on individuals at the very top of the administrative hierarchy and are able to separate the intensive margin (i.e., wage increases) from any additional effects at the extensive margin (i.e., new appointments). Using close elections for inference in a regression discontinuity analysis, we find that politician–bureaucrat alignment significantly increases top bureaucrats’ wage even in the Norwegian civil service system. This has important implications also from a theoretical perspective. Our results indeed go against predictions from models with policymotivated bureaucrats, but are consistent with politically aligned principal–agent matches being more productive.
Geys, Benny & schönhage, Nanna Lauritz (2021)
Politicians' party membership allows voters to overcome incomplete information issues. In this article, we maintain that such ‘party cues’ in multilevel governance structures also induce voters to incorporate their assessment of incumbents at one level of government into their assessment of incumbents at other levels of government. Moreover, we argue that these assessment ‘spillovers’ increase in magnitude with voters' level of political information. They become particularly prominent for voters with higher levels of political knowledge and interest as well as during election periods (when information is less costly and more readily available). Empirical analyses using survey data from Germany covering the period 1990 to 2018 corroborate our theoretical propositions.
Geys, Benny & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2020)
Does delegation of the budget preparation process to top civil servants improve or worsen fiscal performance? We address this question by analyzing high‐quality data on budgetary procedures and fiscal performance over a 25‐year period in Norwegian local governments. This long time period allows exploiting substantial variation in budgetary procedures across time and space. The results show that administrative delegation decreases fiscal deficits as a share of current revenues. Compared to procedures relying on political coordination or the traditional ‘bottom‐up’ procedure, deficits are approximately 0.3 percentage points lower on average under administrative delegation. Still, this effect is conditional upon the presence of minority governments and fails to materialize when the mayor enjoys majority support in the local council. Our results thus indicate that administrative delegation in budgetary processes may constitute an important tool to alleviate poor fiscal performance arising due to political coordination failures and weak political decision‐making.
Daniele, Gianmarco; Galetta, Sergio & Geys, Benny (2020)
Political scandals often trigger responses from voters and the implicated politicians. In this article, we extend the analysis to politicians who are only indirectly affected by a scandal through their affiliation with the involved party. Overcoming endogeneity concerns by analyzing the local implications of the largest national scandal in recent Italian history (“Clean Hands”), our main results show that local politicians withdraw support from incumbents in parties hit by Clean Hands – inducing early government dissolutions in such municipalities. Consistent with these municipality-level findings, we then illustrate that local politicians from the implicated parties exhibit lower re-running rates and higher rates of party switching in the short term. In the medium term, we find that corruption and voter turnout are lower in competitive municipalities ‘treated’ with a mayor from the implicated parties during Clean Hands. Moreover, medium-term upward career mobility of local politicians from the implicated parties benefited from party switching.
Geys, Benny & Hernæs, Øystein Marianssønn (2020)
In this article, we study the political implications of terrorism rooted in extremist political ideologies. Our data uniquely allow studying the potential role of party leader evaluations on political outcomes, including voter turnout and vote choice. To strengthen causal identification, we combine an event-study framework with the fact that Norwegians were affected personally to differing degrees by the 22 July 2011 terror attack because of variation in the victims’ municipalities of residence. Our main findings suggest that extreme right-wing terrorism influences party vote intentions and evaluations of political leaders strongly in the short run, as well as party choice in actual elections in the longer run. We document shifts within Norway’s left-right political blocs rather than shifts between those blocs frequently observed following religious/separatist violence.
Geys, Benny; Connolly, Sara Jane, Kassim, Hussein & Murdoch, Zuzana (2020)
Public sector organizations face regular turnover in top leadership positions. Yet little is known about how such changes affect staff attitudes. The authors argue that top leader succession may influence staff attitudes, particularly when new leaders are “outsiders” and/or subordinates interact regularly with their leaders. Using a unique two-wave survey conducted within the European Commission in 2008 and 2014, this analysis tests these propositions by studying the same individuals before and after shifts in top political (commissioner) and administrative (director-general) positions. The study shows that leadership succession can trigger meaningful shifts in subordinates’ stated attitudes regarding the European Commission’s supranational identity. These findings are important because staff attitudes about organizational values and aims represent a key driver of individual and organizational performance.
Geys, Benny; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2020)
British Journal of Political Science, 51(3), s. 1348- 1355. Doi: 10.1017/S0007123419000607
Support for environmental protection is generally perceived as driven by cohort or generational effects. We argue and empirically illustrate that such attitudes also fluctuate over the life cycle. Using rotating panels of the Norwegian Election Studies (1989-2013), our analysis is able to identify such life-cycle effects while controlling for cohort and period effects through a methodological innovation exploiting the first-derivative properties of the environmental concern function. Our main findings provide strong evidence of an inverted U-shape over the life cycle, which implies that substantial population aging in advanced economies may partially offset any generational shift towards a greater emphasis on protecting the environment.
Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A. (2020)
Sardoč, Mitja (red.). Handbook of Patriotism
Geys, Benny & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2019)
Women have historically been underrepresented in democratic assemblies, particularly in top positions with executive powers. Most gender quota reforms address this by mandating a more equal gender representation on election lists. In contrast, a 1992 legislative reform in Norway required parties' candidate lists for the local executive board to comprise at least 40% politicians of each gender. This legal change was not only exogenously imposed by a higher-level government, but also generated distinct quota-induced constraints across Norwegian municipalities. We exploit the resulting variation in ‘quota shocks’ using a difference-in-differences design to identify the quota's effect on women's political representation as well as local public policies. We find that more women enter the executive board after the reform, though spill-overs on women's representation in the local council and on the probability of a female mayor or top administrator are weak. We also find no consistent evidence for shifts in public policies due to increased representation of women in positions with executive powers.
Murdoch, Zuzana; Kassim, Hussein, Connolly, Sara & Geys, Benny (2019)
European Journal of International Relations, 25(3), s. 852- 877. Doi: 10.1177/1354066118809156
Titl, Vitezslav & Geys, Benny (2019)
We study whether and when firms’ donations to political parties induce favouritism in public procurement allocations. Our analysis builds on a unique, comprehensive dataset covering all public procurement contracts and all corporate donations to major political parties in the Czech Republic over the period from 2007 to 2014, and exploits changes in political control over regional governments within this period for identification purposes. We find that firms donating 10% more to a political party gaining (losing) power witness an increase (decrease) in the value of their public procurement contracts by 0.5–0.6%. Importantly, and in line with theoretical expectations, these effects only arise for contracts allocated under less restrictive procurement allocation processes. Assessing the underlying mechanisms, we show that donating firms receive more small contracts allocated under less regulated procurement procedures, face less competition in more regulated and open procurement procedures, and tend to win with bids further above the estimated cost of the procurement contract.
Boenisch, Peter; Geys, Benny & Michelsen, Claus (2019)
This article analyses how the presence of a dominant group of voters within the electorate affects voter turnout. Theoretically, we argue that its absolute size affects turnout via increased free-riding incentives and reduced social pressure to vote within a larger dominant group. Its relative size compared to other groups within the electorate influences turnout through instrumental and expressive responses – in both the dominant and dominated groups – to the degree of electoral competition between groups. Empirical evidence from a large cross section of German municipalities is in line with these theoretical predictions. The observed effects should be taken into account when redesigning electoral jurisdictions through, for instance, municipal mergers or gerrymandering.
Slegten, Caroline; Geys, Benny & Heyndels, Bruno (2019)
De Witte, Kristof; Geys, Benny & Schönhage, Nanna Lauritz (2018)
Political economists have long maintained that politicians respond to both (re-)election and financial incentives. This article contributes to the latter literature by analysing whether, when and how local office-holders respond to the economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and remuneration of local politicians. Building on insights from the urban economics and public finance literatures, we argue that local politicians may strategically adjust fiscal and housing policies to stimulate in-migration when approaching a population threshold where their remuneration increases. Using data from all 589 Belgian municipalities over the period 1977–2016, our results confirm that approaching important population thresholds causes lower local tax rates and the granting of additional building permits (particularly for apartments). These policy changes occur early in the election cycle and, at least for housing policy, are restricted to incumbent mayors themselves expecting to benefit from crossing the population threshold.
Holm, Joshua & Geys, Benny (2018)
Recent evidence of increasing income heterogeneity within developed countries has reignited debates concerning the redistribution of income and wealth. In this article, we contribute to this debate by assessing the role of individuals’ jurisdictional identification for their preferences toward intrafederation redistributive financial flows. Incorporating insights from social identity theory in a model of redistributive taxation, we show that federal, rather than local, identification can lead individuals to shift their redistribution preferences independent of their narrowly defined personal economic interests. Moreover, contrary to conventional wisdom, welfare state support will sometimes be decreasing in national identification. We empirically assess these predictions using individual-level data from the 2008 German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) and a 2013-2014 survey among Belgian local politicians. Our findings provide strong support for the model’s core predictions in both settings
Geys, Benny & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2018)
Despite the increasing stress on performance in public sector organizations, there is still little empirical evidence on whether—and if so, how—politicians respond to performance information. This article addresses this research gap by linking registry statistics on school performance in Norway's 428 municipalities with data from an information experiment embedded in a survey of local politicians. Findings show that school performance bears only a weak relationship to politicians' preferences for resource-related reforms, but it strongly affects preferences for governance-related reforms, indicating the importance of accounting for heterogeneity across alternative types of (school) reforms. Moreover, local politicians are, on average, well informed about school performance. This reflects the force of local inhabitants' high information level on politicians' accountability.
Trondal, Jarle; Murdoch, Zuzana & Geys, Benny (2018)
Individuals' role perceptions are central guides to their behavior and choices as members of an organization. Understanding organizational dynamics thus requires knowledge about the determinants of such role perceptions, as well as whether—and when—organizations can influence them. This article brings forward a theoretical framework allowing for both prerecruitment (extraorganizational) and post-recruitment (intraorganizational) determinants of individuals' role perceptions, and examines its empirical implications using a large-N data set of temporary officials in the European Commission. We find that intergovernmental and epistemic role perceptions are strongly linked to pre-recruitment factors (such as educational and professional background), whereas postrecruitment factors (such as length of affiliation and embeddedness within the Commission) are the main driving force behind supranational and departmental role perceptions. This heterogeneity in the importance of pre- and postrecruitment factors for distinct role perceptions has important consequences for conceptualizing organizational change.
Geys, Benny & Qari, Salmai (2017)
Geys, Benny; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2017)
Journal of Public Economics, 152, s. 47- 54. Doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.05.006
Recent research explores the effect of financial and career incentives on public-sector hiring processes and subsequent performance. The reverse relation between performance and bureaucrats’ compensation and turnover has received only limited attention. Due to the distinct features of public-sector organizations, bureaucrats are traditionally argued to require either permanent positions and fixed wages, or low-powered performance incentives. This article studies how the performance of top civil servants in Norwegian local governments affects their compensation and turnover. We thereby build on a unique new dataset over the period 1991-2014. Our results indicate that better performing top civil servants obtain a higher compensation and are less likely to be replaced. Nonetheless, these incentives remain low-powered in line with agency theory prescriptions.
Geys, Benny (2017)
Kuehnhanss, Colin; Murdoch, Zuzana, Geys, Benny & Heyndels, Bruno (2017)
Mahieu, Bram; Geys, Benny & Heyndels, Bruno (2017)
Geys, Benny & Smith, Daniel Markham (2017)
Geys, Benny (2017)
Hassan, Mamdouh & Geys, Benny (2017)
Murdoch, Zuzana; Trondal, Jarle & Geys, Benny (2016)
Freier, Ronny; Geys, Benny & Holm, Joshua (2016)
Blockmans, Tom; Geys, Benny, Heyndels, Bruno & Mahieu, Bram (2016)
Geys, Benny & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2016)
Cancela, Joao & Geys, Benny (2016)
Hassan, Mamdouh & Geys, Benny (2016)
Hassan, Mamdouh & Geys, Benny (2016)
Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten (2016)
Daniele, Gianmarco & Geys, Benny (2016)
Exbrayat, Nelly & Geys, Benny (2016)
Trondal, Jarle; Murdoch, Zuzana & Geys, Benny (2015)
National officials working in international bureaucracies regularly invoke the fear that member states strategically use such officials for influencing decision making and agenda-setting to their advantage. This article theoretically analyses conditions under which the autonomy of national civil servants in international bureaucracies might become compromised. The ensuing predictions are then tested using a unique survey among seconded national experts (SNEs) in the European Commission (N ≈ 400). Finally, evaluating the characteristics linked to reduced autonomy among SNEs in the Commission, the article illustrates that these officials are, in practice, likely to be relatively independent from member state influence.
Asatryan, Zareh; Feld, Lars P. & Geys, Benny (2015)
Daniele, Gianmarco & Geys, Benny (2015)
European Journal of Political Economy, 39, s. 1- 12. Doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.03.005
Daniele, Gianmarco & Geys, Benny (2015)
Trondal, Jarle; Murdoch, Zuzana & Geys, Benny (2015)
Daniele, Gianmarco & Geys, Benny (2015)
Geys, Benny (2015)
The German Economic Review, 16(1), s. 1- 12. Doi: 10.1111/geer.12041
Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten (2014)
Backhaus, Jûrgen Georg (red.). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
Murdoch, Zuzana & Geys, Benny (2014)
De Witte, Kristof; Geys, Benny & Solondz, Catharina (2014)
Economics of Education Review, 40, s. 152- 166. Doi: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2014.02.003
Ashworth, John; Geys, Benny, Heyndels, Bruno & Wille, Fanny (2014)
Applied Economics, 46(19), s. 2264- 2276. Doi: 10.1080/00036846.2014.899679
Geys, Benny (2014)
Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan (2014)
Exbrayat, Nelly & Geys, Benny (2014)
International Tax and Public Finance, 21(2), s. 298- 323. Doi: 10.1007/s10797-013-9270-3
Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten (2014)
Michelsen, Claus; Geys, Benny & Boenisch, Peter (2014)
Public Choice, 159(3-4), s. 469- 483. Doi: 10.1007/s11127-013-0061-2
Geys, Benny & Osterloh, Steffen (2013)
Journal of Regional Science, 53(4), s. 583- 606. Doi: 10.1111/jors.12029
Geys, Benny; Heinemann, Friedrich & Kalb, Alexander (2013)
Raumforschung und Raumordnung, 71(4), s. 283- 293. Doi: 10.1007/s13147-012-0191-x
De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny (2013)
European Journal of Operational Research, 224(3), s. 592- 602. Doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.09.002
Geys, Benny (2013)
Political Studies, 61(2), s. 462- 472. Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00956.x
Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten (2013)
The Journal of Legislative Studies, 19(1), s. 76- 97. Doi: 10.1080/13572334.2013.737158
Geys, Benny (2012)
Journal of Civil Society, 8(2), s. 201- 206. Doi: 10.1080/17448689.2012.686753
Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten (2012)
German Politics, 21(3), s. 255- 273. Doi: 10.1080/09644008.2012.716040
Ben-Bassat, Avi; Dahan, Momi, Geys, Benny & Klor, Esteban F. (2012)
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 18(2) Doi: 10.1515/1554-8597.1256
Geys, Benny & Murdoch, Zuzana (2012)
Journal of European Public Policy, 19(9), s. 1357- 1376. Doi: 10.1080/13501763.2012.677186
Geys, Benny (2012)
Electoral Studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy, 31(2), s. 406- 412. Doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2012.01.005
Geys, Benny (2012)
Journal of Civil Society, 8(1), s. 1- 15. Doi: 10.1080/17448689.2012.665646
Griesshaber, Nicolas & Geys, Benny (2012)
European Societies, 14(1), s. 57- 81. Doi: 10.1080/14616696.2011.638084
Qari, Salmai; Konrad, Kai A. & Geys, Benny (2012)
Public Choice, 151(3-4), s. 695- 717. Doi: 10.1007/s11127-011-9765-3
Kalb, Alexander; Geys, Benny & Heinemann, Friedrich (2012)
Applied Economics, 44(2), s. 201- 218. Doi: 10.1080/00036846.2010.502110
Geys, Benny & Revelli, Federico (2011)
Environment and Planning. C, Government and Policy, 29(3), s. 410- 427. Doi: 10.1068/c10116r
De Witte, Kristof & Geys, Benny (2011)
Journal of Urban Economics, 69(3), s. 319- 327. Doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2010.12.002
Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A. (2010)
Enderlein, Henrik; Wälti, Sonja & Michael, Zürn (red.). Handbook on Multi-Level Governance
Geys, Benny & Murdoch, Zuzana (2010)
Sociology, 44(3), s. 523- 540. Doi: 10.1177/0038038510362474
Recent research illustrates that two distinct interpretations and operationalizations of ?bridging? and ?bonding? social networks co-exist in the literature (based on links between diverse networks or between socio-economic groups within a given network, respectively), and that these do not coincide in empirical applications. The present contribution first confirms this conclusion using data from the United Kingdom. Then, we suggest a simple way to integrate both existing approaches into a more general measure of bridging and bonding. Applying this more general index to UK and Flemish data, a) provides stronger empirical support for the idea that memberships in bridging groups are more strongly linked to positive civic values than those in bonding ones, and b) shows that the extended index behaves more consistently across institutional settings (i.e. Flanders and the UK) than both underlying measures independently
Geys, Benny & Murdoch, Zuzana (2008)
British Journal of Sociology, 59(3), s. 435- 454.
Geys, Benny & Leiren, Merethe Dotterud (1)
Natural resources forum (Print) [Kronikk]
|2004||Vrije Universiteit Brussel||Ph.D Dr. Oecon.|
|2000||Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL)||Master of Science|
|2019 - Present||BI Norwegian Business School||Professor in Economics|
|2010 - 2020||Vrije Universiteit Brussels||Research Professor|
|2015 - 2019||BI Norwegian Business School||Professor in Economics|
|2010 - 2015||BI Norwegian Business School||Associate Professor|
|2005 - 2010||WZB Berlin||Senior research fellow|