Leif Helland was associate professor at BI Norwegian Business School 2003-06. Full professor since 2006. He teaches game theory and negotiations. Helland is Dr. polit. (2001) and Cand. polit. (1992) from the University of Oslo, and M.Sc. (Econ) from the LSE (1991).
He has previously held positions as Doctoral Fellow (1995-99) and Research Fellow (00-01) at the Department of Political science/University of Oslo, Post Doctoral Fellow (2002-03) at the Center of International Climate and Environmental Research in Oslo (CICERO), and Senior Executive Officer (1992-95) in the Norwegian Ministry of Finance (Budget department).
Helland was Visiting Scholar at the Political Science Department/UC Berkeley 1996/97. In 2003-04 Helland had leave of absence from BI Norwegian Business School, to direct the secretariat of a white paper Commission on Party Finance. Helland was a member of the white paper commission on public subvention of cultural activities in 2007-2008.
Research areas Applied Game Theory; Political economy; Experimental economics
We experimentally investigate the impact of strategic uncertainty and complementarity on leader and follower behavior using the model of Farrell and Saloner (1985). At the core of the model are endogenous timing, irreversible actions and private valuations. We find that strategic complementarity strongly determines follower behavior. Once a subject decides to abandon the status quo the probability that other players jump on the bandwagon increases sharply. However, there is a reluctance to lead when leading is a conditional best response. We explain this deviation from the neo-classical equilibrium by injecting some noise in the equilibrium concept. We also find that cheap talk improves efficiency.
Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. An important question is whether including conditional components in NDCs might enhance the agreements effectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment based on a mixed sequential-simultaneous public good game with one leader and three followers that helps answer this question. The experiment investigates how two factors influence the effectiveness of leadership based on intrinsically conditional commitments. Measuring e¤ectiveness in terms of followers' and total contributions, we find that it may help if the conditional promise is credible and if its implementation influences followers' welfare substantially. Importantly, however, for both factors we fi nd a signi cant effect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group's efforts. These fi ndings have important implications concerning the future success of the Paris agreement.
Helland, Leif; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Preugschat, Edgar (2017)
Information and coordination frictions in experimental posted offer markets
We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Second, they indicate that compliance enforcement will boost compliance significantly in the presence of participation enforcement. Our results also add to the experimental literature on public goods provision, again in two ways. First, they reveal that previous experimental findings of enforcement boosting cooperation are valid only in settings with forced (or enforced) participation. Second, they show that subjects’ willingness to allocate costly punishment points is significantly stronger when the enforcement system permits punishment of both types of free riding than when it permits punishment of only one type.
Helland, Leif & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2015)
Partisan bias, electoral volatility, and government efficiency
Helland, Leif; Hovi, Jon & Monkerud, Lars Christian (2012)
Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence
European Journal of Government and Economics, 1(2), s. 106- 125.
Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.
Helland, Leif; Sørensen, Rune J. & Thorkildsen, Åge (2010)
Forsvaret 1986-2005. Hvorfor partiene favoriserer de overrepresenterte valgdistriktene
Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning, s. 525- 548.
Helland, Leif (2010)
"... so that you never need to ask your question again"
Homo Oeconomicus, 27(3), s. 350- 54.
Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon (2010)
Non-instrumental behavior in an environmental public goods game
Homo Oeconomicus, 27(3), s. 241- 262.
This paper reports a puzzling result from an experiment based on an indefinitely repeated N -player Prisoners’ Dilemma game carried out in a PC lab. The experiment used real monetary payoffs, and was conducted in the context of international cooperation to curb climate change. It was puzzling that after the experiment, a large majority of subjects reported they were at least partially motivated out of concern for the climate; however, nothing they did in the experiment could possibly have had an impact on the climate. We show that subjects acting out of concern for the climate incurred a real cost in monetary terms, and argue that many subjects’ behavior in the experiment deviated quite fundamentally from instrumental rationality. Although much recent research on public goods provision questions the traditional assumption that players are purely self-regarding, the assumption of instrumental rationality is typically preserved. The results reported in this paper go some way towards challenging the validity of this assumption.
Helland, Leif & Sørensen, Rune J. (2009)
Hvorfor overlever politisk korrupsjon i representative demokratier?
Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 25(3), s. 219- 236.
Helland, Leif & Sørensen, Rune J. (2009)
Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects
This article investigates strategic coordination in four elections to the Norwegian Storting (1909–18). The elections were held under a majority-plurality dual-ballot system, with unrestricted participation in the second-ballot. The focus is on elections with Conservative, Liberal and Labour candidates as main contenders. Supported by historical and theoretical arguments, the authors assume universally sincere voting in the first-ballot. Given this assumption, second-ballot elections can be analyzed as regular plurality elections. Hypotheses about behavior are formed using the game theoretic framework of Myerson and Weber (American Political Science Review 87 (1993) 102–114). It is found that while voters follow the predictions of theory fairly closely, the extent of coordination present at the candidate level can be questioned.
Helland, Leif & Saglie, Jo (1999)
Kandidatkonkurranse og strategisk koordinering i fire stortingsvalg: 1909-1918
Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift, 15(2), s. 155- 183.
To vanlige tanker om restriktive valgsystemer er at: 1) Velgerne vil forlate høyt rangerte kandidater som forventes å være sjanseløse til fordel for lavere rangerte kandidater med vinnersjanser. 2) Kandidater som forventer å bli forlatt av velgerne selv vil trekke sitt kandidatur. I artikkelen konfronteres disse tankene (i presisert form) med data fra fire stortingsvalg i perioden 1909-1918. Konfrontasjonen viser at den første tanken har mer for seg enn den andre. Vi spekulerer over noen mulige årsaker til dette.
Fiva, Jon H.; Helland, Leif & Sørensen, Rune J. (1)
Én stemme kan endre politikken http://www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2015/09/13/2040/Kommunevalg/n-stemme-kan-endre-politikken