Adjunct Professor - Department of Finance
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Adjunct Professor - Department of Finance
Molnar, Peter & Nyborg, Kjell Gustav (2013)
European Financial Management, 19(3), s. 419- 428. Doi: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2011.00619.x - Full text in research archive
Cooper and Nyborg (2008) derive a tax-adjusted discount rate formula under a constant proportion leverage policy, investor taxes and risky debt. However, their analysis assumes zero recovery in default. We extend their framework to allow for positive recovery rates. We also allow for differences in bankruptcy codes with respect to the order of priority of interest payments versus repayment of principal in default, which may have tax consequences. The general formula we derive differs from that of Cooper and Nyborg when recovery rates in default are anticipated to be positive. However, under continuous rebalancing, the formula collapses to that of Cooper and Nyborg. We provide an explanation for why the effect of the anticipated recovery rate is not directly visible in the general continuous rebalancing formula, even though this formula is derived under the assumption of partial default. The errors from using the continuous approximation formula are sensitive to the anticipated recovery in default, yet small. The ‘cost of debt’ in the tax adjusted discount rate formula is the debt's yield rather than its expected rate of return.
Bindseil, Ulrich; Nyborg, Kjell Gustav & Strebulaev, Ilya A. (2009)
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(7), s. 1391- 1421. Doi: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.00261.x
What is the nature of imperfections in the market for liquidity? Studying bidder level data from European Central Bank (ECB) repo auctions, we find that this market appears to be informationally efficient in the sense that participants do not have private information about future short-term rates. However, auction allocations affect banks' subsequent behavior in a way that is consistent with a degree of allocational and operational inefficiency. Also, large bidders appear to have better access to the interbank market than small ones. Finally, the evidence suggests that the ECB uses collateral haircuts that do not equilibrate opportunity costs.
Cooper, Ian A. & Nyborg, Kjell Gustav (2008)
Financial Management, 37(2), s. 365- 379. Doi: 10.1111/j.1755-053X.2008.00016.x
This paper derives a tax-adjusted discount rate formula with a constant proportion leverage policy, investor taxes, and risky debt. The result depends on an assumption about the treatment of tax losses in default. We identify the assumption that justifies the textbook approach of discounting interest tax shields at the cost of debt. We contrast this with an alternative assumption that leads to the Sick (1990) result that these should be discounted at the riskless rate. These two approaches represent polar cases. Each generates its results by using a different simplifying assumption, and we explain what determines the correct treatment in practice. We also discuss implementation of the valuation procedure using the capital asset pricing model.
Cooper, Ian A. & Nyborg, Kjell Gustav (2006)
Journal of Financial Economics, 81(1), s. 215- 225. Doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.07.003
Fernandez [2004b. The value of tax shields is not equal to the present value of tax shields. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 145-165] argues that the present value effect of the tax saving on debt cannot be calculated as simply the present value of the tax shields associated with interest. This contradicts standard results in the literature. It implies that, even though the capital market is complete, value-additivity is violated. As a consequence, adjusted present value formulae of a standard sort cannot be used. Also, Fernandez's argument implies that the value of the tax saving differs front conventional estimates by a considerable amount. We reconcile Fernandez's results with standard valuation formulae for the tax saving from debt. We show that, as one would expect, the value of the debt tax saving is the present value of the tax savings from interest. The apparent violation of value-additivity in the Fernandez paper comes from mixing the Miles and Ezzell and Miller and Modigliani leverage policies.
Keloharju, Matti; Nyborg, Kjell Gustav & Rydqvist, Kristian (2005)
Journal of Finance, 60(4), s. 1865- 1902. Doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00782.x
We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developing and testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a data set of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently treating the auctions as a repeated game between itself and primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing react to the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner's curse. We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developing and testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a data set of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently treating the auctions as a repeated game between itself and primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing react to the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner's curse.
Nyborg, Kjell Gustav (2015)
[Report]. Norges Handelshøyskole. Institutt for Foretaksøkonomi.
The financial turmoil that we have been living with since August 2007 has left central banks, regulators, politicians, and economists with two big, overriding questions: How do we best get out of the crisis and how should banks be regulated and markets organized to avoid such crises in the future. This paper deals with the second question. Specifically, the paper deals with the third pillar of Bank supervision under Basel II, namely market discipline. The idea of this pillar, as summarized by Emmons, Gilbert, and Vaughan (2001), is for supervisors and regulators to make use of information about the financial health of banks that is contained in securities prices. In particular, as explained by Emmons et al: “The recent market discipline discussion centers on proposals to require some banks to issue a standardized form of subordinated debt.” Flannery (1998) discusses this more broadly and reviews the evidence on the effectiveness of using market information in prudential supervision. My proposal here is that the market discipline approach could usefully look for information about banks’ financial health outside of the securities markets.
|1990||Stanford University| USA||PhD|
|2016 - Present||BI Norwegian Business School||Adjunct professor|
|2015 - Present||University of Zurich||Vice Director|
|2009 - Present||University of Zurich||Chaired Professor of Finance|
|2005 - 2009||Norwegian School of Economics||Professor|
|2003 - 2005||UCLA, Anderson School of Management||Visiting Associate Professor|
|1997 - 2004||London Business School||Associate professor|
|1990 - 1997||London Business School||Assistant professor|
|1984 - 1985||A/S Storebrand-Norden Group||Computer Programmer|