Jon H. Fiva is a professor of economics at the Norwegian Business School (BI) working on political economics, labor economics and health economics. His past research has been published in American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Journal of Health Economics, Journal of Public Economics, and other journals.
Women tend to experience a substantial decline in their labour income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such ‘child penalties’ also exist in the political arena? Using comprehensive administrative data from Norway, we find that women are less likely than men to secure elected office after their first child is born. The effects manifest already from the nomination stage, where mothers receive less favourable rankings on party lists relative to comparable fathers. This paper broadens our understanding of a fundamental social issue in political representation and demonstrates how motherhood affects even positively selected women.
Fiva, Jon H. & Nedregård, Oda (2024)
How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Term Variation in Lame-Duck Status.
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 19(2), s. 191- 216. Doi: 10.1561/100.00022094
Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H., Smith, Daniel M. & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)
Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort
How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections, where seat outcomes are uncertain only for candidates in marginal list positions? We argue that parties can solve this moral hazard problem by committing ex ante to allocate higher offices in government, such as cabinet portfolios, monotonically with list rank. Under this schedule of compensation, parties have incentives to rank candidates in order of quality (under some conditions) and candidates have incentives to increase the volume and geo-diversity of their campaign efforts as their rank improves. Using detailed data on Norwegian candidates and their use of mass and social media in recent elections, we confirm that (1) candidate quality increases with list rank, and (2) candidates in safer ranks shift from intra-district to extra-district and national media exposure—a composition of effort that can increase their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.
Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2021)
Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional Representation Systems
We investigate whether geographic representation affects local voting behavior in closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, where conventional theoretical wisdom suggests a limited role of localism in voter preferences. Using detailed data on Norwegian parliamentary candidates' hometowns, we show that parties engage in geographic balancing when constructing candidate lists. However, because most districts contain more municipalities than seats, not all municipalities will ultimately see a local candidate elected. A regression discontinuity design applied to marginal candidates reveals that parties obtain higher within-district support in subsequent elections in incumbents' hometowns — novel evidence of "friends-and-neighbors" voting in an otherwise party-centered environment. Exploring the mechanisms, we find that represented municipalities often continue to have locally-connected candidates in top positions, in contrast to municipalities with losing candidates, and are more frequently referenced in legislative speeches. There is no evidence that unequal representation creates inequalities in distributive policies.
Building on agency-theoretical perspectives of public bureaucracies, we argue that politician–bureaucrat preference alignment can have important implications for bureaucrats’ pay. We study such private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians using detailed data on all 1,632 top administrators active in all Norwegian municipalities over a period of 25 years (1991–2015). Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician–bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of top bureaucrats ran for political office. We focus explicitly on individuals at the very top of the administrative hierarchy and are able to separate the intensive margin (i.e., wage increases) from any additional effects at the extensive margin (i.e., new appointments). Using close elections for inference in a regression discontinuity analysis, we find that politician–bureaucrat alignment significantly increases top bureaucrats’ wage even in the Norwegian civil service system. This has important implications also from a theoretical perspective. Our results indeed go against predictions from models with policymotivated bureaucrats, but are consistent with politically aligned principal–agent matches being more productive.
Cirone, Alexandra; Cox, Gary W. & Fiva, Jon H. (2021)
This paper investigates party use of seniority systems to allocate nominations for elected and appointed offices. Such systems, which can regulate party members’ access to offices at multiple levels of their careers, are defined by two main rules or norms: an incumbent re-nomination norm and a seniority progression norm. Using comprehensive electoral and candidate data from Norwegian local and national elections from 1945 to 2019, we find systematic patterns consistent with these two norms. Our work illuminates an institutional aspect of candidate selection that the current literature has ignored while noting some of the important consequences of seniority-based nominations for party cohesion and stability.
Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites, but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. This article addresses this issue by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in Norway in 1919, which permits the measurement of parties’ vote shares in pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect on the fragmentation of the party system, due in part to strategic party entry. The authors find, though, that another main effect of the reform was that many voters switched between existing parties, particularly between the Liberals and Conservatives, as the incentives for these voters to coordinate against Labor were removed by the introduction of PR.
Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon Hernes & Smith, Daniel M. (2020)
The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).
Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel Markham (2019)
Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation
A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties.
Fiva, Jon H. & Røhr, Helene Lie (2018)
Climbing the ranks: incumbency effects in party-list systems
Incumbents tend to have a solid electoral advantage in candidate-centered electoral settings. Do similar incumbency effects exist in more party-centered environments? We estimate incumbency effects in an open-list proportional representation system, exploiting that seats are first allocated across parties, and then to candidates within party lists. Using data from Norwegian local elections 2003–2015, we document that a candidate that barely wins a seat in the local council has about a 9 percentage points (43%) higher probability of being elected in the next election compared to a candidate that just misses out on a seat on the same party list. We find no evidence that voters contribute to this personal incumbency advantage. Rather, it seems as if party elites are instrumental in securing the electoral success of their party affiliates. We show that incumbents and non-incumbents run again in the subsequent election at about equal rates, but that incumbents tend to advance in the party hierarchy and obtain safer ballot positions in future elections, which is what ultimately leads to electoral success.
Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2018)
The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway
We show that small shifts in representation can affect policy in proportional election systems. Using data from Norway, we find that a larger left-wing party leads to more property taxation, higher childcare spending, and lower elderly care spending, while local public goods appear to be a non-partisan issue. These effects are partly due to shifts in bloc majorities, and partly due to changes in the left–right position of the council, keeping the majority constant. The estimates on spending allocations are rather imprecise, but they are consistent with evidence on politicians' fiscal preferences and patterns in media attention.
Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)
Norwegian parliamentary elections, 1906?2013: representation and turnout across four electoral systems
Frivillig kommunesammenslåing - betydningen av folketall, inntekt og politisk avstand
Frich, Jan C; Iversen, Tor & Tjerbo, Trond (red.). Helsepolitikkens faglige premisser
I denne artikkelen analyserer vi lokale folkeavstemninger om kommunesammenslåing. Det forventes at stor forskjell i folketall, inntektsnivå og politiske preferanser mellom kommuner vil gjøre sammenslåing vanskelig. Det foreligger data for 253 folkeavstemninger i den reformprosess som nå foregår. Mange kommuner har holdt flere avstemninger og har stilt spørsmål om flere alternativer. Analysen her baserer seg på forskjeller blant kommuner innen en aktuell sammenslåings-konstellasjonen og ser bare på symmetriske folkeavstemninger. Hovedresultatet er en positiv sammenheng mellom folketall og andel ja-stemmer til sammenslåing. Bekymringen for å bli overkjørt ser ut til å være større enn håpet om stordriftsgevinster for små kommuner. Analysen indikerer at politisk avstand betyr noe i tillegg – man ønsker ikke å bli styrt av et annet politisk flertall. Vi studerer også beslutningen om å holde avstemning og valgdeltagelsen. Små kommuner har høyere tilbøyelighet til å holde folkeavstemning. Små og rike kommuner innen konstellasjonen har høyere valgdeltagelse – de har mer å forsvare.
Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)
Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway
Pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts. Such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system. We estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed-list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown. Using data from Norwegian regional governments, we still find a hometown bias. We document that municipalities with a representative on the regional council from the same party as the regional governor tend to obtain more funding for local investments. Citizens also tend to vote more often for parties whose gubernatorial candidate is from their own hometown, consistent with expectations of particularistic benefits. A possible explanation is that regional council members are often recruited from local politics and remain loyal to their roots. We find no evidence that regional council experience affects politicians' future career prospects at the local level.
Fiva, Jon H. & Folke, Olle (2016)
Mechanical and psychological effects of electoral reform
Recent theoretical contributions indicate favorable incentive effects of property taxation on public service providers. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with data from Norwegian school districts. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited for analyzing the effects of property taxation because one can compare school districts with and without property taxation. To take into account potential endogeneity of the choice of implementing property taxation, we rely on instrumental variable techniques. The empirical results indicate that, conditional on resource use, property taxation improves school quality measured as students' result on the national examination.
Fiva, Jon H. (2007)
Sentral finansiering av lokal offentligt tjenesteproduksjon: Bailout-problemet
Økonomisk forum
Fiva, Jon H. & Rattsø, Jørn (2007)
Local Choice of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norway
Public Choice, 132(3-4), s. 457- 470.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2007)
Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway
Fiscal competition may influence the design of tax systems. The tax competition literature has concentrated on mobility of tax base and tax levels, while we turn the attention to the political decision-making system and the determination of tax structure. In the Norwegian setting local governments make a discrete choice whether to have property tax. The local choice is investigated in an econometric model allowing for yardstick competition. Our results indicate that yardstick competition explains the distinct geographic pattern in local property taxation observed. Grants have no effect on the propensity to have property taxation, consistent with the flypaper effect. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending
FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis (FA), 62, s. 250- 280.
Rattsø, Jørn & Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
Welfare Competition in Norway: Norms and Expenditures
European Journal of Political Economy, 22, s. 202- 220.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)
Welfare competition in Norway: Norms and expenditures
European Journal of Political Economy, 22, s. 202- 222.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2023)
Glasstaket består i lokalpolitikken
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
King, Max-Emil Mohn & Fiva, Jon H. (2022)
Vi har undersøkt om barn er en karrierebrems i politikken. Vi finner betydelige kjønnsforskjeller.
Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.) [Kronikk]
Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)
Lokal favorisering
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Fiva, Jon H. (2011)
Boligprisene påvirkes av skolerangering
Aftenposten [Avis]
Fiva, Jon H. (2011)
Ingen vits i pappaperm?
Aftenposten [Avis]
Fiva, Jon H. (2011)
Flere stemmer i rike kommuner
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
Kniper på sosialhjelpen for å slippe tilflytting
Kommunal Rapport [Avis]
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
Høy stønad frister
Aftenposten [Avis]
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
Kommuner vil ikke ha «sosial» tilflytting
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle James (1)
Skatten de elsker å hate https://www.bi.no/bizreview/artikler/skatten-de-elsker-a-hate/
Klassekampen [Kronikk]
Fiva, Jon H.; Helland, Leif & Sørensen, Rune J. (1)
Én stemme kan endre politikken http://www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2015/09/13/2040/Kommunevalg/n-stemme-kan-endre-politikken
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Fiva, Jon H. (1)
Trekk lodd, Halvorsen
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Cirone, Alexandra; Cox, Gary W., Fiva, Jon H., Smith, Daniel M. & Teele, Dawn (2023)
Gender Gaps in Political Seniority Systems
[Report]. Elsevier.
Closed-list proportional representation (PR) generates higher average levels of descriptive representation for women. But because parties control candidate promotion, often based on seniority rules, gender bias in the seniority system can potentially curtail women’s career advancement. We theorize how seniority systems might operate in a gender-neutral way at three stages of a typical national-level political career: (1) nomination, (2) renomination and rank advancement, and (3) promotion to cabinet. Using detailed candidate-level data from Norway covering more than a century of elections, we find that career advancement in the seniority system is generally gender-neutral. However, we also identify two “majoritarian bottlenecks”—local mayoralties and top list positions—where women’s seniority-based career advancement may face challenges, and describe how parties appear to have employed workarounds to prevent these bottlenecks from adversely affecting women’s representation at higher levels of the political hierarchy.
Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2023)
Bound by Borders: Voter Mobilization through Social Networks
[Report]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2023)
Sick of politics?
[Academic lecture]. Research Workshop on the Selection of Politicians and Bureaucrats.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2023)
Sick of polics?
[Academic lecture]. Political Economy Workshop.
Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2022)
Child Penalties in Politics
[Report]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research.
Women tend to experience substantial declines in their labor income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such “child penalties” also exist in the political arena? Using extensive administrative data from Norway and an event-study methodology, we find that women drop out of local politics to a larger extent than men after their first child is born. Parenthood also seems to have a differential long-term effect on women and men's political careers, which may explain why women, especially women with children, are underrepresented at higher levels of the political hierarchy.
Fiva, Jon H. & Nedregård, Oda (2022)
How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Session Variation in Lame Duck Status
[Report]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research.
How important are political parties in motivating and disciplining elected officials? Using a difference-in-discontinuity design, we study how shocks to incumbents’ re-election probabilities affect legislative behavior in a setting where parties fully control candidate selection. We find that within-session variation in lame-duck status has a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame-duck status affects the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives.
Fiva, Jon H.; Hagen, Terje P. & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)
Kommunal organisering
[Textbook]. Universitetsforlaget.
Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)
Popular, but not powerful: Local candidates under closed-list proportional representation
[Academic lecture]. 2017 Annual Meeting.
Geographic representation is considered to be an important factor in candidate nominations, even under closed-list proportional representation (PR), and may also matter for distributive policy outcomes. However, since nominations are determined strategically, the causal effects of representation for local areas are difficult to iden-tify. We study candidate nominations, voter behavior, and distributive policies in the closed-list PR setting of Norway (1953-2013). Exploiting as-good-as-random election outcomes for candidates who are marginally close to winning a seat in parliament, we find that parties obtain higher support in subsequent elections in the hometowns of narrowly-elected candidates. This effect appears to be driven by an increase in the probability of having the local candidate at the top of the party list in the next election. However, we find no effect of local representation on geographically targeted policy benefits for the hometown. Our results suggest that local candidates under closed-list PR are able to attract and mobilize local voters, but either do not have the power to obtain distributive benefits for their localities, or are not interested in seeking them.
Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)
Popular, but not Powerful: Local Candidates under Closed-list Proportional Representation
[Academic lecture]. Bruneck Workshop on the Political Economy of Federalism and Local Development.
Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)
Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments
[Academic lecture]. NICEP Inaugural Conference.
Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)
Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway
[Academic lecture]. Bremen Workshop on The Politics of Parliamentarization.
Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)
Popular, but not powerful. Local candidates under closed-list proportional representation
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar.
Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)
Local favoritism under at-large proportional representation systems
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar.
Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)
Does local representation matter under closed-list PR?
[Academic lecture]. Political Economy Workshop.
Halse, Askill Harkjerr; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)
A bridge too far? The political economy of local road investments in Norway
[Academic lecture]. Forskningsseminar, SSB.
Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2015)
Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems
[Academic lecture]. 9th Norwegian-German Seminar on Public Economics.
Fiva, Jon H. (2015)
Political Dynasties in Party-Centered Environments
[Academic lecture]. University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics Seminar.
Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2015)
Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems
[Academic lecture]. Forskermøtet 2015 (37th Annual Meeting of the Norwegian Association of Economists).
Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)
Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives
Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?
[Academic lecture]. WZB workshop on 'Reflections on Fiscal Federalism: Elaborating the Research Agenda'.
Fiva, Jon H. (2009)
Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?
[Academic lecture]. North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society.
We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election proba- bility and explore empirically how this variation in°uences the incumbents' invest- ment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This result aligns with a theoretical framework where political par- ties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between capital and °ow variables in government production.
Fiva, Jon H. (2009)
Do Re-Election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?
[Academic lecture]. CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics.
We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election proba- bility and explore empirically how this variation in°uences the incumbents' invest- ment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This result aligns with a theoretical framework where political par- ties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between capital and °ow variables in government production.
Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2008)
Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?
[Report]. Ifo Institute for Economic Research.
Fiva, Jon H. (2008)
Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?
[Academic lecture]. Nordic Workshop on Tax Policy and Public Economics.
Fiva, Jon H. (2008)
Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?
[Academic lecture]. Congress of the European Economic Association.
Fiva, Jon H. (2008)
Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?
[Academic lecture]. European Public Choice Society Meeting.
Fiva, Jon H. (2008)
Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?
[Academic lecture]. National Economist Meeting.
Fiva, Jon H. (2007)
Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?
[Academic lecture]. New Perspectives on Fiscal Federalism: Intergovernmental Relations, Competition and Accountability.
Fiva, Jon H. (2007)
Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity
[Academic lecture]. Annual Conference European Association of Labor Economists Annual Conference (EALE).
Fiva, Jon H. (2007)
Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity
[Academic lecture]. 2nd Workshop on Fiscal Federalism.
Fiva, Jon H. (2007)
Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity
[Academic lecture]. First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2006)
The Incentive Effects of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norwegian School Districts
[Report]. Statistisk Sentralbyrå.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
[Academic lecture]. 8th ZEW Summer Workshop on 'EU Countries in Fiscal Competition.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending
[Academic lecture]. European Public Choice Society Meeting.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)
New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending
[Academic lecture]. Nasjonal forskermøte for økonomer.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)
Decentralization with property taxation to improve incentives: Evidence from local governments’ discrete choice
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Decentralization of government with property tax financing is the standard recipe for public sector reform. Fiscal competition is assumed to stimulate efficiency and hold down the tax level. Property taxation offers additional incentives for efficiency. We study the incentive mechanisms involved using data for decentralized governments and in a setting where they can choose to have property taxation or not. The empirical analysis addresses whether fiscal competition and political control problems influence the choice of having property taxation. The results indicate that both incentive mechanisms are relevant and consequently support the standard advice. Fiscal competition generates a distinct geographic pattern in local taxation and political fragmentation seems to motivate property taxation to control common pool problems. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)
Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Recent theoretical contributions have emphasized the favorable incentive effects of property taxation. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with Norwegian data on student performance. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited to analyzing the effects of property taxation because we can compare school districts with and without property taxation. In addition, we focus on an alternative incentive mechanism – competition between school districts. The empirical results indicate that students in school districts that levy residential property taxes perform better at the national examination than students in comparable school districts. Strategic interaction in school quality is present, but the magnitude of the interaction effect is modest.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2005)
New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government
[Report]. Ifo Institute for Economic Research.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)
Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency [Vitenskapelig foredrag]
[Academic lecture]. Annual Meeting of the European Public Choice Society (EPCS).
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)
Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency
[Academic lecture]. 27th Annual National Economist Meeting,.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)
Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency
[Academic lecture]. American Public Choice Society Meeting,.
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)
Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice
[Academic lecture]. Research Workshop on Political Economy at Harvard U..
Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)
‘Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice’
[Academic lecture]. 61st International Tax and Public Finance Conference,.
Fiva, Jon Hernes (2005)
‘New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government’
[Academic lecture]. 4th Norwegian-German seminar on Public Economics,.