Before joining BI in 1982, I served on the faculty of the Norwegian School of Economics. I spent one year as visiting faculty at the University of Washington, one year at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and several shorter periods at the Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona, the Instituto de Empresa in Madrid, and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I have worked with a consulting firm in corporate strategy, with an investment bank, and as an expert witness. Over the period 2004-2009, I held the Stein Erik Hagen chair in private ownership. I have been in a 50% position at BI since September 1, 2016.
Research areas
My primary academic interests are corporate finance. The major research efforts have been in capital budgeting, valuation effects of taxation, equity offerings, dividend policy, board composition, shareholder conflicts, ownerless firms, and the governance of family firms. My research is published in outlets like the Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Decision Sciences, Journal of Business Ethics, European Financial Management, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Journal of Economic Psychology, and Energy Economics. Currently, my research focus is on corporate governance. Most of my ongoing projects are linked to the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR), where I am the founding director since 2005. I retired and became Professor emeritus on September 1, 2019.
Teaching areas
I usually teach corporate finance, corporate governance, and valuation at the graduate and executive program levels. I find it challenging and rewarding to present my research to regulators and the business community. I have written two textbooks in corporate finance (current editions are from 2016 and 2017, respectively) and one textbook in corporate governance (2012).
We find that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders strongly influence how dividends respond to taxes. When the controlling shareholder has a smaller stake, the incentives to extract private benefits are stronger – a shareholder conflict that can be mitigated by dividend payout. We study a large and clean regulatory shock in Norway that increases the dividend tax rate for all individuals from 0% to 28%. We find that dividends drop less the higher the potential shareholder conflict, suggesting that dividend policy trades off tax and agency considerations. The average payout ratio falls by 30 percentage points when the conflict potential is low, but by only 18 points when it is high. These lower dividends cannot be explained by higher salaries to shareholders or diverse liquidity needs. We also observe a strong increase in indirect ownership of high-conflict firms through tax-exempt holding companies and suggest policy implications for intercorporate dividend taxation.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Stacescu, Bogdan, Almli, Line & Søndergaard, Kathrine (2019)
We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.
We show how a recent drop in the Norwegian capital uplift rate by two percentage points changes optimal field design and reduces field value for shareholders. Although optimal design changes considerably and value drops by 12%, the ability to reoptimize design after the shock is worth only 1.5% of field value. This evidence suggests that large behavioral effects of a shock do not necessarily imply large value effects, making it less important to always account for the taxpayers' response. The valuation error in such cases may be moderate if one instead uses the simplifying and widespread assumption of unresponsive taxpayers.
We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder’s equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict potential). Such minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority shareholder investment. These results suggest that controlling shareholders voluntarily use dividends to reduce agency conflicts and build trust, rather than opportunistically preferring private benefits to dividends. We show that our results are unlikely to arise from liquidity or signaling motives.
This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low. We find no relationship between firm performance and board independence. These characteristics of value-creating boards support neither popular opinion nor the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Berzins, Janis (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 8(2), s. 65- 75.
Berzins, Janis & Bøhren, Øyvind (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, s. 65- 75.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
Governance and performance revisited
International Corporate Governance after Sarbanes-Oxley, Paul Ali and Greg Gregoriou (ed)
We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2005)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
Økonomisk forum, 59(5), s. 4- 14.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik (2005)
Tvangsinnløsning av minoritetseiere: Rettsøkonomien i norske skjønnssaker gjennom 25 år" (Minority buyouts: Law and economics in Norwegian courts over 25 years)
Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 118(1-2), s. 122- 152.
We examine to what extent firms adhere to the stated intent of noncompulsory accounting standards when reporting for intercorporate investments. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in Norway strongly recommend that a 20–50% intercorporate investment is accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method, if the investment is long-term, of strategic importance, and involves significant influence. Even so, we find that the actual use of the equity method is independent of the duration of the investment period, the fraction of equity held, its recent growth, and the investor's voting power. This lack of compliance suggests that one cannot use the observed choice between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying characteristics of the investment as specified by the accounting standard. Flexible GAAP may therefore not induce firms to disclose the information that the GAAP were designed to produce.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2003)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 20, s. 3- 17.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2002)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Hope, Einar (red.). Næringspolitikk for en ny økonomi
Bøhren, Øyvind (2002)
Finansparadigmet
Essays on Uncertainty - Festskrift til Steinar Ekerns 60-årsdag
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Patterns of corporate ownership: insights from a unique data set
Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 27, s. 55- 86.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1998)
The agent's ethics in the principal-agent model
Journal of Business Ethics, 17, s. 745- 755.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Why underwrite rights offerings? Some new evidence
Journal of Financial Economics, 46, s. 223- 261.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Norli, Øyvind (1997)
Determinants of intercorporate shareholdings
European Finance Review, 1, s. 265- 287.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Risk components and the market model: A pedagogical note
Applied Financial Economics, 7, s. 307- 310.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1997)
Prosjektanalyse
Skarvet Forlag.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1996)
Norske aksjeemisjoner
Praktisk økonomi & ledelse, 12(4), s. 47- 57.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Thorsland, Arne & Tollefsen, Pål (1996)
Gjeldsstrukturen i norske aksjeselskaper
Praktisk økonomi & ledelse, 12(2), s. 51- 60.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Corporate cross-ownership and market aggregates: Oslo Stock Exchange 1980-1990
Journal of Banking & Finance, 18, s. 687- 704.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1993)
På leting etter god pristeori: Historien om kapitalverdimodellen
Sosialøkonomen, 47(2), s. 20- 24.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Larsen, Knut, Michalsen, Dag & Schwencke, Hans Robert (1991)
Egenkapitalrentabilitet og skatt: En kritisk analyse
Beta, 5(1), s. 54- 63.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Skattebaserte finansieringsinsentiver i norske aksjeselskaper fra 1970 til 1990
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift, 104(4), s. 303- 336.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Merton Miller, norsk beskatning og finansiell verdiskapning
Sosialøkonomen, 44(11), s. 13- 15.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1990)
Theory development processes in the social sciences: The case of stochastic choice theory
Journal of Economic Psychology, 11(1), s. 1- 34.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
PC-integrert undervisning i bedriftsøkonomi: Pedagogiske hensyn
Beta, 1(4), s. 101- 106.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
Beta, 1(1), s. 23- 30.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter
Sosialøkonomen, 40(9), s. 19- 23.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1984)
The validity of conventional valuation models under multiperiod uncertainty
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 11(2), s. 199- 211.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Sparing med skattefradrag: en privatøkonomisk analyse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 45(10), s. 532- 537.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Skattefradrag for realrenter
Sosialøkonomen, 37(9), s. 12- 16.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Bounding certainty equivalent factors and risk-adjusted discount rates
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 10(1), s. 139- 146.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Norsk oljepolitikk i beslutningsanalytisk perspektiv
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44(2), s. 128- 135.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Effektiv rente på boliglån: en empirisk undersøkelse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355- 360.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Å løse investeringsproblemer
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355- 360.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Fuglaas, Geir (1981)
Yrkesvalg og lønnsomhet: NHH kontra næringsliv og forvaltning
Bedriftsøkonomen, 43(9), s. 480- 485.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1981)
Probabilities proportional to time-state prices
Economics Letters, 8(4), s. 1- 6.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Hansen, Terje Rein (1980)
Capital Budgeting with Unspecified Discount Rates
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 82(1), s. 45- 58. Doi: 10.2307/3439551
Bøhren, Øyvind & Schilbred, Cornelius M. (1980)
North Sea oil taxes and sharing of risk: a comparative case study
Energy Economics, 2, s. 145- 153.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1980)
Informasjonsøkonomi - en selektiv oversikt
Erhvervsøkonomisk Tidsskrift, 44(1), s. 31- 48.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Hansen, Terje (1979)
Akseptable gjeldsrenter i inflasjonstider
Sosialøkonomen, 33, s. 18- 20.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1979)
Consistent rankings based on total and differential amounts under uncertainty
Decision Sciences, 10(4), s. 519- 526.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1978)
Kostnadsoverskridelser og skatteregler i Nordsjøen
Bedriftsøkonomen, 40(10), s. 494- 495.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1978)
Investeringsplanlegging under budsjettrestriksjoner - en kommentar
Sosialøkonomen, 32, s. 28- 39.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1976)
Om vurdering av teori: Anvendelse av vurderingskriterier med Howard-Sheth modellen som eksempel
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift, 13(3), s. 1- 16.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2018)
Er Norge avhengig av arverekken i familiebedrifter?
NRK [Radio]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
El secreto de Noruega para tener a los tres multimillonarios más jóvenes del mundo
BBC World [Internett]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
SSB-styret kritiseres for å ha sviktet Meyer
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Tilstrekkelig makt til å passe på pengene
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Aker får stryk for regnestykke
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Ombudstvedt får kritikk fra de usikrede kreditorene
dn.no [Internett]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Røkke kan tjene to milliarder – uten å betale én krone i skatt
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Eierne i Hafslund på vei mot rettslokalet
Dagbladet [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Styrene burde bare få betalt i aksjer de ikke kan selge
Dagens Perspektiv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Dette er gullgruvene i norsk næringsliv
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Når mor er sjefen din på jobb
NRK P2 Ekko [Radio]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Dette vil Christoffer overta, hvis pappa sier ja
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2017)
Flere gjør som Thon og Mohn
Aftenposten [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2016)
Professorer: Enten Brekke eller Wærsted er ferdig i Telenor
e24.no [Internett]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2016)
Hva er den beste formen for eierskap?
Tønsberg Blad [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2016)
Gir råd med CAPS LOCK
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2016)
The youngest billionaire in the world is a Norwegian teenager
Forbes [Fagblad]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Telenor striden - Full krise
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Ukjent med fryktkultur
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Børsen ser på saken
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Styr Norges Bank bedre
BI Business Review [Internett]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Styr Norges Bank bedre
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Jobben som vaktbikkje blir illusorisk
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Johan H. Andresen: Vil gi døtrene større valgfrihet
Aftenposten [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Sier noe om hennes integritet
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Helnorsk tradisjon, unorsk eier
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2015)
Strammer inn på ledergoder
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Kontroll, ikke verdiskapning
Finansavisen [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Småsparerne hamstret
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Ekstremt vanskelig jobb foran seg
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Vil markere at de gjør noe konkret
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Dette mister staten kontroll på
e24.no [Internett]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
KrF-misnøye med hastekutt
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind & Remøy, Håvard (2014)
Klyngje ikkje gull for eigarane
Sunnmørsposten [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Er næringsklynger spesielt lønnsomme?
BI Business Review [Internett]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Unoterte aksjer skaper splittelse
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Hagens utvalgte
Ukeavisen Ledelse [Fagblad]
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Denne familien har drevet brusfabrikk i snart 100 år
The corporate finance and governance of limited liability firms: Basic characteristics
[Report]. BI Norwegian Business School.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Josefsen, Morten (2007)
Do stakeholders matter for corporate governance? Behavior and performance of Norwegian banks 1985-2002
[Report]. Handelshøyskolen BI.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2007)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Academic lecture]. 34th Annual EFA Meeting.
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2006)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
[Article in business/trade/industry journal]. Praktisk økonomi & finans, s. 91- 103.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Priestley, Richard & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
The duration of equity ownership at the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989-1999
[Report]. Handelshøyskolen BI.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2006)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Academic lecture]. Workshop on the Politics of Corporate Governance.
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2005)
The value-creating board: Theory and evidence
[Report]. BI Norwegian Business School.
This paper explores empirically how board composition influences the conflict of interest between agents and principals, the production of information for monitoring and support, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. We find that potential agency costs in our sample firms are high because the ownership-driven monitoring incentives are low. The average board has only six members, gender diversity is low, roughly half the firms have employee directors, and most CEOs are neither directors in their firm nor elsewhere. Using a wide set of such board characteristics and new measures of board independence and director networking, static and dynamic fixed effects panel data models show that value-creating boards are aligned with their shareholders, but dependent on the CEO. Multiple directorships create valuable information networks, whereas diversity in terms of gender, board size, and employee directors reduces value. Models accounting for endogeneity and reverse causation support these conclusions.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Corporate governance and economic performance in Norwegian listed firms
[Report]. Handelshøyskolen BI.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (2001)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2000)
The ownership structure of Norwegian firms: Characteristics of an outlier
[Report]. Handelshøyskolen BI.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1999)
Prosjektanalyse
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag AS.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Bjørn Espen, Michalsen, Dag & Smith, David C, (1997)
Corporate dividend policy in Norway
[Report]. BI Norwegian Business School.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Haug, Jørgen & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Consolidation policy and managerial discretion: Accounting for intercorporate shareholdings
[Report]. BI Norwegian Business School.
Gjærum, Per Ivar & Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring. 3.utgave (Project analysis. 3rd ed.)
[Scientific book]. Skarvet.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Isachsen, Arne Jon (1991)
Forsker og forretningsmann: En verdiskapende allianse